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ABSTRACT
We analyse the evolution of the price of paintings in London auctions with a
unique data set of over 200,000 sales in the period 1780–1840. We build a price
index for the representative painting through hedonic regressions controlling for
the characteristics of auctions and paintings and for the artists’ ﬁxed eﬀects.
The emergence of an eﬃcient secondary art market was an important opportu-
nity for portfolio diversiﬁcation. Estimating a CAPM model for art investment
suggests that British paintings could deliver a higher return compared to
imported paintings and an attractive source of diversiﬁcation relative to the con-
temporary stock market. This contributed to increase the demand for British art
and, possibly, to promote the innovations of its Golden Age. While the represen-
tative painting of the British school was initially undervalued, new British pain-
ters reached foreign prices by the beginning of 1800s.
The Arts will always ﬂourish in Proportion to the patronage
given them by the Rich, Joseph Banks
We examine the market for paintings in London between the end of the
1700s and the beginning of the 1800s through the analysis of art auctions of
this period.1 The econometric analysis of a unique data set, which is larger
than any data set on historical art prices used before, allows us to investigate
art pricing in the secondary market, build an accurate hedonic price index2
and provide some preliminary considerations on the economic determinants
of art pricing3 and art investment.4
Probably for the ﬁrst time in art history, the development of an eﬃcient
auction market in a vital ﬁnancial centre such as London did turn art
*Ca’ Foscari University of Venice and Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies
1 For a recent art historical review of British art in this period, see Solkin (2015).
2 For an alternative price index, see the recent work by Spaenjers et al. (2015). Related
applications of quantitative methods to the economics of art can be found in Graddy and
Pownall (2016) and Goetzmann et al. (2016).
3 While most of the work is empirical, for a recent theory of art pricing, see Itaya and
Ursprung (2016).
4 The ﬁnancial analysis of investment in art was started by Stein (1977) and Baumol
(1986). See Agnello (2016) for a recent application.
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investment into a ﬁnancial opportunity. In particular, we argue that British
paintings were initially undervalued but could guarantee a higher return com-
pared to imported paintings and an attractive source of diversiﬁcation relative
to the contemporary stock market. The increase in demand and price of Bri-
tish art may have played an important role in fostering the artistic innovations
of the British Golden Age.5
Our work is related to a growing body of literature on historical art mar-
kets emphasizing the economic determinants of artistic production and inno-
vation. Since the pioneering work of Montias (1982), interdisciplinary
research in economic history and cultural economics, has been focused on the
organization of artistic markets in Italy (for instance, see Spear and Sohm,
2010; Etro and Pagani, 2012 2013; Pinchera, 2014; Etro et al., 2015; Boro-
wiecki, 2015), the Netherlands (Montias, 1996; De Marchi and Van Miegroet,
1994; Montias, 2002; Etro and Stepanova, 2016), Spain (Etro and Stepanova,
2017), England ( Cowan, 2006; Bayer and Page, 2011) and France (Etro and
Stepanova, 2015). These studies have pointed out a number of interesting styl-
ized facts and have provided descriptive statistics on the paintings traded by
painters, owned by collectors or traded in auctions between the XVII and
XIX century.6 However, most of them are based on limited data sets with few
hundreds or, at most, few thousands of observations on art prices, which can
be hardly representative of the entire trade in art at the time.
In this work, we focus on London auctions with a unique data set from the
Getty Research Institute with over 200,000 transactions. The period under
consideration, between 1780 and 1840, became to be known as the Golden
Age of British paintings (see Vaughan, 1999, Solkin, 2015). This coincided,
not by chance, with an innovative age characterized by an unprecedented
development of the ﬁnancial markets in London, a rapid accumulation of cap-
ital in the country made possible through international trade, and the develop-
ment of technological innovations at the basis of the First Industrial
Revolution.
Our data set contains all the paintings traded at any price in any available
auction house during the period. An important related work by Bayer and
Page (2011) has analysed paintings traded at extremely high prices (above 100
pounds) between 1740 and 1909, and all the paintings traded at Christie’s in
the period 1840–1885. Therefore, it is a representative sample only for a later
period, and mainly for the major auction house. Besides these substantial dif-
ferences in data sets, Bayer and Page (2011) focus on other research questions
and provide interesting evidence on the mixed social origins of sellers and
buyers active in the auctions. A result of their empirical investigation is that
British paintings were sold at prices that were signiﬁcantly lower than the
5 Our considerations based on the analysis of the British market for paintings should be
seen as complementary to art historical considerations. However, prominent art historians
like Solkin (1996) have already emphasized the importance of the market environment for
the development of the British school. See also Hamilton (2014).
6 The economics of Renaissance art in Italy between the XIV century and the XVI century
is studied in Etro (2016).
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imported paintings. Moreover, they have shown smoothed average prices
emphasizing an increasing trend in art prices during the Victorian age.7 We
complement this work with a fully ﬂedged econometric analysis.
We conﬁrm that prices of British paintings remained on average well
below the prices of imported paintings, but tended to increase more over
time. We start by running hedonic regressions that emphasize the determi-
nants of art pricing and we compute through them hedonic price indeces
for all the paintings and for those of diﬀerent national schools. This allows
us to obtain annual return rates for the investment in paintings in general
as well as in paintings of diﬀerent national schools. In particular, we
obtain an average return rate of 4.3% for art investment, but the return
for investment in the British school is both higher (7.2%) and riskier com-
pared to investment in other schools. Applying a basic CAPM methodol-
ogy on return/risk of the stock market and the art market (see Stein, 1977,
and Agnello, 2016), we show that investment in British art was an attrac-
tive investment option also in terms of portfolio diversiﬁcation, while the
aesthetic dividend from owning paintings was higher for Italian and Dutch
works compared to the British ones. While only suggestive, because of the
limited data on the stock market of the period, these results are in line
with the fact that British collectors did value foreign paintings more but
they started to invest in the undervalued British paintings to look for bet-
ter returns and diversify their investments.
This may have been a key factor driving the increasing demand for
domestic art also in the local primary market, which in turn did foster
innovative artistic activity. We support this Schumpeterian thesis by show-
ing that the faster appreciation of British paintings was largely due to the
new painters. Indeed, the prices of the new British painters entering in the
market during the 1700s did increase relatively to the others, reaching the
same levels of the imported paintings for the local artists that started their
activity at the end of the century. Painters of the British Golden Age such
as Lawrence, Reynolds, Wilkie and Turner ﬁnally reached the same prices,
as well as the same international recognition, of the best contemporary
continental masters.
The article is organized as follows. Section I describes the development of
the art market in London in detail setting the stage for the subsequent eco-
nomic analysis. Section II focuses on the auction market and describes the
data set based on auctions’ results. Section III presents the econometric analy-
sis, estimates a simple CAPM model to investigate whether investment in Bri-
tish art was attractive and provides evidence that increasing prices of the new
domestic painters were driving the higher returns of the British school. Sec-
tion IV concludes.
7 More interestingly, Bayer and Page (2011) present a repeated sale price index for the per-
iod 1840–1900 which shows a rapid increase in the price of representative paintings. Since we
focus on the earlier period 1780–1840, our work can be seen as complementary to theirs.
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I THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BRITISH MARKET FOR PAINTINGS
Since Medieval time, the supply of paintings in the British isles has been con-
ﬁned to a marginal production of decorative paintings, including heraldic
signs, coach decorations, theatrical scenery and furniture elements. Art histori-
ans (for instance Gombrich, 1995) have often associated the prolonged artistic
backwardness of England with the inﬂuence of the Anglican Church, which
banished commissions of ﬁgurative paintings from religious institutions. Such
an explanation, however, is not suﬃcient because private commissions may
have replaced public ones, possibly with a bias toward non-ﬁgurative paint-
ings (as it happened in the Netherlands). Instead, the main British collectors
imported most of their high-quality paintings from the more advanced Italian
and Flemish markets.
The Worshipful Company of Painter-Stainers, which originated from a
medieval guild to regulate the craft of painting, tried to set limitations on the
imports of artworks at least since the XV century (with laws of 1463 and
1483), but there is no evidence that this ban was eﬀective before its explicit
abolition in 1695 (Ormrod, 1998). Even import tariﬀs had a limited impact on
the trade of paintings. Initially they were ad valorem, increasing from 20% to
60% at the end of the XVII century, but they could be easily evaded by
declaring a low value for the imported paintings. As a consequences, speciﬁc
tariﬀs based on the size of paintings were introduced later on,8 although their
impact was mainly to select the import of paintings of higher value. Indeed,
the high-segment of the British art market was dominated for centuries by
imports of continental works, often acquired during the Grand Tour of the
British aristocrats, as well as by the production of immigrant artists.9 Many
of them were established masters who moved to England to work for the
Crown, as in the well-known cases of Hans Holbein during the XVI century
or Anthony Van Dyck, Orazio Gentileschi, Antonio Verrio or Willem van de
Velde (both the Elder and the Younger) during the XVII century.10 England
was accumulating a substantial stock of imported paintings without develop-
ing a real primary or secondary art market.11
The need of pictures for home decoration started to emerge slowly during the
XVII century, as documented by the presence of cheap paintings and prints in
8 Since 1721 duties of 1, 2 or 3 pounds were applied respectively to paintings smaller than
2 feet square, up to 4 feet square and above this threshold. Additional 5% ad valorem tariﬀs
were introduced in 1747 and 1759 (Ormrod, 1998, p. 171).
9 Bayer and Page (2011, p. 17) notice that 300/500 paintings were probably imported annu-
ally in the last forty years of the 1600s and during the same period more than a hundred
Dutch painters visited England.
10 After moving to the Court of Charles I in 1632, Van Dyck obtained a knighthood, the
title of principal painter in ordinary to the King, the yearly pension of 200 pounds and a
house. Antonio Verrio painted twenty ceilings and three staircases at Windsor, the King’s
Chapel and St. George’s Hall, receiving the huge payment of 7945 pounds, and later the
Heaven Room at Bourghley House for £ 500. He also obtained the royal pension of £ 200.
11 Also in the case of prints, England will remain a net importer until the 1780s, when it
will start to export prints especially to France. The only signiﬁcant exports of paintings,
instead, will be destined to the colonies, especially Jamaica, New York and Pennsylvania
(Pears, 1988, p. 57).
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inventories of middle-class London houses between 1693 and 1713 (Gibson-Wood,
2002). Nevertheless, the demand for works of minor genres was largely satisﬁed by
Dutch paintings: in economic terms, England had not a comparative advantage in
the painting sector (Ricardo, 1821). Immigrant Dutch painters arrived in dozens at
the turn of the century. In the absence of eﬀective competition from local painters,
they could command high prices, as the documented 70 pounds that Simon Verelst
was asking for his still-life paintings in 1669, apparently becoming the best paid
painter in town (Solkin, 2015, p. 22). All of this is suggestive of a typical phe-
nomenon emerging in a sector characterized by external economies of scale and a
learning curve (Graham, 1923). The continental art markets, especially the Dutch
and Flemish ones, had developed (over centuries) suﬃcient production externalities
to supply paintings with a quality-price ratio that the British art sector could not
match in a free market (except possibly for the portraits, where local demand could
allow for the accumulation of some production externalities).12 Accordingly, the
domestic production of paintings could not start exploiting its learning curve as
long as the foreign supply was better serving the scarce domestic demand. Still in
the ﬁrst half of the XVIII century, the demand for artistic decorations was largely
satisﬁed by imported paintings13 and by many immigrant painters, including top
Venetian painters such as Antonio Pellegrini, Sebastiano Ricci and even Cana-
letto.14 Domestic demand was rapidly raising during this age of increasing prosper-
ity of the middle class. Meanwhile, the new imports of foreign paintings started to
adversely aﬀect quality, and a new production of home forgeries of old master
paintings emerged and prospered. Also as a result of this, demand ﬁnally began to
turn toward the domestic production during the mid XVIII century (see Solkin,
1996; Bayer and Page, 2011).
The development of a British school during the 1700s was gradual and
associated with a dynamic economic environment that could stimulate and
reward innovations (Pears, 1988). One of the ﬁrst prestigious commissions of
ﬁgurative paintings for a British painter was assigned in 1715 through an open
competition for the decoration of the dome of the St. Paul’s Cathedral, when
James Thornhill won over foreign masters such as Pellegrini, Ricci and others.
Most developments, however, took place in minor genres: the father of the
British school, William Hogarth, introduced conversation pieces and a new
12 Nevertheless, in the 1730s a French art critic, Jean-Bernard Le Blanc, was still judging
the quality of British portraits in the following terms: ‘The portrait-painters are at this day
more numerous and worse in London than ever they have been ... I have been to see the
most noted of them; at some distance one might easily mistake a dozen of their portraits for
twelve copies of the same original. Some have the head turned to the left, others to the right:
and this is the most sensible diﬀerence to be observed between them. Moreover, excepting
the face, you ﬁnd in all the same neck, the same arms, the same ﬂesh, the same attitude ...
Properly speaking, they are not painters: they know how to lay colours on the canvas, but
they know not how to animate it.’ (see Solkin, 2015, p. 125).
13 The annual average number of imported pictures in London during the 1760s reached
880 according to Ormrod (2002).
14 In the case of Canaletto, the speciﬁc purpose was circumventing the English dealer
Joseph Smith, who had moved to Venice to intermediate Canaletto’s vedute for British collec-
tors with huge markups. Canaletto organized two personal exhibitions in London, one in
1749 and another in 1751, and then preferred to move back to Venice.
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version of genre paintings, characterized by satirical and moral illustrations,
and started monetizing his eﬀorts by selling prints after his paintings. The suc-
cess of his set of engravings ‘A Harlot’s Progress’ (1732), reaching 1240 sub-
scribers at one guinea each, resulted in pirated reproductions by unscrupulous
printsellers.15 As a consequence, before issuing a second set of prints (‘A
Rake’s Progress’), Hogarth lobbied the Parliament to obtain the Engravers’
Copyright Act, also known as the Hogarth’s Act (1735), which was the ﬁrst
copyright law for art and launched a ﬂorid market for prints. Hogarth
exploited the new IPR protection by accelerating his production (dispensing
with preparatory painting) and expanding his subjects to the life of the lower
class,16 while other painters did so by quickly preparing and advertising prints
for new novels, as Francis Hayman and Joseph Highmore did for Samuel
Richardson’s Pamela.
The ﬁrst genre in which England and Scotland (as well as Ireland) started
to develop artistic capabilities was portraiture, with early masters such as
Peter Lely and Godfrey Kneller emerging in the middle of the XVII century,17
and a wide number of minor artists specialized in portraits. During the ﬁrst
half of the XVIII century portraiture, usually priced by size or by number of
ﬁgures, kept being well remunerated and started to attract new talents: in the
1730s Jonathan Richardson ‘was in a position to demand 70 guineas for a
full-length, but only 20 guineas for a “three-quarters” (also called a bust-
length or a head-and-shoulders)’ according to Solkin (2015, p. 86). The most
ambitious painters, such as Knapton, Ramsay and Reynolds, travelled to Italy
to learn the classic style and went back to London ready to conquer such a
lucrative business. Joshua Reynolds became the most celebrated between
them, and exploited this expanding sector with an accurate activity of market-
ing. As Vaughan (1999, p. 82) notices, ‘he was assiduous in having engravings
made of his pictures for wider circulation. When Lawrence Sterne shot to
fame with the publication of Tristan Shandy in 1760, Reynolds painted his
portrait and had it engraved, achieving great proﬁt’. By the second half of the
1700s portrait commissions were more proﬁtable in London than anywhere
else: ‘a typical price in the 1750s in a successful London practice was 24 gui-
neas for a half-length and 48 guineas for a full-length ... Top of the league
was Reynolds, who at the height of his success demanded 200 guineas for a
15 For future reference, a gold guinea was worth 21 shillings, and a pound was worth 20
shillings.
16 Solkin (2015 p. 109) emphasizes that ‘the reduced investment of time and money made
it possible for the artist to sell each series upon its publication – that is to say, without solic-
iting for subscriptions in advance – and to charge considerably less for them than for any of
his previous sets of prints. One important consequence of this novel marketing strategy was
to make it possible to imagine that these Modern Moral Subjects could be bought by the
same lower classes of society who were depicted in the scenes themselves’.
17 Lely reached wealth and royal recognition, with an annual pension of £ 200 awarded as
the heir of van Dyck. Kneller went further: as Solkin (2015, p. 42) notices, ‘no other painter
in British history has ever monopolized the production of oﬃcial portraits of the sovereign
to so great an extent or for so long. Selling countless copies to the government at £ 50 a time
made Kneller an extremely rich man’. However, he could make more money in the private
market, where he was charging £ 66 for a full-length portrait.
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full-length and 100 for half-length. These prices were substantial even within
Britain’ (Vaughan, 1999, pp. 42–43).18 In this environment, other talented
portraitists ﬂourished, such as Thomas Gainsborough, George Romney and
the Scottish masters Henry Raeburn and Allan Ramsay.
The development of a British school of historical paintings was slow, at ﬁrst
stimulated by public commissions for charity institutions (such as the paint-
ings for the Court Room of the Foundling Hospital, whose Governor was
Hogarth), which contributed to support a new ethical mission for painting,
aimed at cultivating social virtues, as claimed by the philosopher Shaftesbury.
This principle was even formalized in the Treatise on Ancient Painting by
George Turnbull (1740), although Bernard de Mandeville criticized it in his
Fable of the Bees (1723) claiming that private vices, in particular the consump-
tion of luxury goods like paintings (independently from their subjects), do sus-
tain a civilized and enriching society. The arguments of the Scottish
economists on the invisible hand of free markets will soon follow in Adam
Smith’s Wealth of Nations (Smith, 1776), written right at the beginning of the
period under our consideration.
The emergence of places where paintings could be exhibited in public paid
a key role in fostering the demand for art. Exhibitions could take place in the
famous Spring Gardens at Vauxhall (opened in 1732 and decorated with
paintings by Hogarth and Hayman) or in showrooms as the one of the auc-
tioneer Christopher Cock, and it was in these locations that a large and
heterogenous public could be reached for the ﬁrst time.19 The role of clubs
and even coﬀeehouses in publicizing art has been equally important and has
contributed to the emergence of art criticism as a profession.
The consecration of domestic painting, however, happened in 1760, with
the launch of an annual exhibition and a competition for the best painting of
a subject from national history, and in 1768 with the foundation of the Royal
Academy of Arts, consisting of forty members under the direction of Rey-
nolds.20 The main event organized by this institution was the same art exhibi-
tion, which between 1780 and 1838 took place in the large rooms prepared at
‘Somerset House’ in the Strand, selecting works from all genres. In spite of
explicit support, the artistic achievements of the ﬁgurative genre in the ‘gran
18 In 1754, the Swiss pastellist Liotard managed to be paid 400 guineas for the portraits of
the members of the family of the Princess of Wales Augusta.
19 As Solkin (1996) notices, ‘the Gardens provided the most pertinent and readily available
model for an economics of art production responsive to the character of the modern public
sphere – an economics predicated ﬁrst and foremost on a need to satisfy the interest of an
exceedingly large audience, many of whose members had little understanding of or sympathy
for the ﬁner points of connoisseurship. It was people of this sort who streamed in their thou-
sands to the early exhibitions; and while the shows may not have been expressly designed to
turn a proﬁt, indirectly at least they were meant to serve a commercial purpose, by cultivat-
ing as broad as possible an interest in the visual arts’.
20 Other academies without royal patronage had been founded before, as the Society of the
Virtuosi of St. Luke established in 1689, the Great Queen Street Accademy directed since
1711 by Kneller and since 1716 by Thornhill and re-established as St Martin’s Lane Academy
by Hogarth in 1734. A St. Luke’s Academy was also set up in 1729 in Edinburgh, while the
Dublin Society was funded in 1731 (Arnold, 1977).
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manner’ will be limited, except for the notable exceptions of the American
painters Benjamin West and John Singleton Copley. West presented his Death
of General Wolfe at the 1771 exhibition with great success, managing to sell it
for a sum between £ 400 and £ 600 and receiving commissions of ﬁve more
copies, one for King George III. Copley was credited for the ﬁrst successful
one-picture show with his exhibition in the Spring Gardens of the Death of
the late Earl of Chatham (1781, now in the National Portrait Gallery, Lon-
don), which attracted over 20,000 visitors. The painter may have got up to £
5000 in admission fees alone, the double of the market value of the painting,
evaluated £ 2625 in 1788 but actually sold in a 1806 lottery for £ 2100. A sim-
ilar success happened for his huge Floating Batteries at Gibraltar (1783–91)
for whose commission Copley outbid the rival West accepting a compensation
of £ 1000 but recouping the cost of years of work from a private exhibition
(with 60,000 visitors) and from the sales of the engravings. These engravings
were prepared by John Boydell, an innovative art dealer specialized in the
business of commissioning paintings of attractive subjects (for instance a series
on Shakespeare’s plays) to make proﬁt from the sale of their prints.
Another signiﬁcant talent as Joseph Wright of Derby exploited the large public
of the exhibitions to introduce innovative solutions aimed at representing the
new world of ‘enlightenment’ and technological progress in England (as in the
celebrated Experiment on a Bird in the Air Pump, 1768, now at the Tate Gallery,
London). As Solkin (1996, p. 231) has noticed, ‘these pictures were designed with
the reproductive print trade in mind. In such circumstances the pressures to suc-
ceed demanded a sort of picture which had to appeal to a much larger and
socially more heterogeneous audience than Shaftesbury’s public of landed gentle-
men’. But besides exhibitions, art development needed a stable market where
paintings could be priced and traded on an ordinary basis.
II LONDON ART AUCTIONS, CHRISTIE’S AND RECORD SALES
Given the limited role of patronage and traditional commissions in the British
primary market, it is not surprising that only the emergence of an eﬃcient
anonymous market for art trade could facilitate the development of a domes-
tic production. Auctions had this role. They were ﬁrst recorded at Somerset
House in London in 1674, at least a century later than in the Netherlands
(Montias, 2002),21 but soon became the leading channel through which paint-
ings were traded in England (Cowan, 2006). In 1689 the auctioneer Edward
Millington provided the ﬁrst regulation for these ascending price auctions (ba-
sically the same valid nowadays), with commissions for the auction houses on
each sale.22 Auctions were mainly taking place from September to March
(when the aristocracy was moving from the countryside to London), in the
21 Before that, ‘outroping’ (deﬁned as selling by the voice at the highest bidder) and ‘sales
by candle’ were organized under a public monopoly.
22 A later legal case (Jenwardine vs. Slade, 1796) will establish another modern principle of
auctions, for which an auction house is not responsible for the attributions of the paintings,
which should be understood only as personal opinions of its experts.
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area around Coven Garden, Charing Cross and the Strand (Gibson-Wood,
2002), and the range of traded items rapidly expanded over time. Their suc-
cess was rapid in the British society, because participation to these events was
associated with what was regarded as a polite display of both wealth and
taste, as well as with the inclusion in the elitarian world of connoisseurship
(Cowan, 2006).23
The ﬁrst auctions were organized by small auction houses and by a variety
of art dealers. The ﬁrst documented art dealers were Thomas Manby, James
Graham and Andre Hay, who travelled repeatedly to the continent to collect
paintings to be sold in London. Robert Bragge was active in the middle of
the 1700s organizing many auctions, including the ﬁrst for which a catalogue
has survived (in 1742). He also imported from the French tradition the prac-
tice of giving basic information on the paintings. However, contrary to what
was happening in Paris during the 1700s, where French art dealers were con-
trolling the market and organizing auctions (see Etro and Stepanova, 2015),
British art dealers were mainly traders who participated to auctions organized
by independent auction houses.24 By the last quarter of the century, the Bri-
tish auction houses were the primary exchange platforms for major collections
arriving from continental Europe, which was often under the threat of politi-
cal instability and wars. The continuous imports of paintings that needed a
secondary market for resale made it possible to create a highly liquid and eﬃ-
cient auction market where artworks of all schools and periods could be
traded. This made it possible for the domestic production to expand as well.
We have studied this secondary art market putting together a data set from
the Getty Research Institute on auctions taking place between 1780 and 1840.
We have data for over 200,000 attributed paintings’ sales from 3393 auctions
held in London.25 The number of transactions increased rapidly over time:
the annual number of auctions in the data set increased from about twenty to
almost two hundred, while the average number of lots per auction was stable
around eighty paintings. During this period Christie’s, founded in 1766, grad-
ually acquired a dominant position in the auction market. Its founder, James
Christie, exploited the two-sidedness of the auction platform to reach
23 As Cowan (2006, p. 163) notices, art ‘became a reﬁned and “polite” arena for elite com-
petition for status and for public recognition of that status. The art auction was something
like a duel, or a cock-ﬁght, by other means’.
24 Bayer and Page (2011) document that dealers active at auction were mainly sellers up to
the beginning of the 1800s and mainly buyers after that (and they were rarely reselling at
auction the same paintings). Interestingly, the time of the shift from net sellers to net buyers
appear close to the peak in the art price index reported below.
25 Auctions were also held in other towns, and we have data on auctions organized in
Liverpool (1300 sales), Bath (900 sales) and Tewkesbury, Norwich and Manchester (each one
with about 500 sales). The small number of these sales shows the cultural dominance of Lon-
don, where most local artists were clustering (see Borowiecki, 2013, for a similar phe-
nomenon for music composers) and led us to exclude them from the analysis for reasons of
homogeneity. In the notable case of Manchester, the average price in thirteen auctions was £
22, above the average price in London, of £ 16. These sales included two works by Joseph
Wright, ‘A Cavern Scene with a Bridge’ and ‘The Bridge and Waterfall at Rydal in West-
morland’, sold for £ 42 and £ 48 (now at the Derby Museum and Art Gallery) and a Titian
sold for £ 770.
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dominance: on one side he heavily publicized his auctions attracting many
potential buyers and on the other side he managed to conquer important con-
signments also from abroad, often secured by oﬀering advances and loans. In
other words, he subsidized one side of the market (the sellers) to increase the
mass of traded paintings while proﬁting on the other side of the market (the
buyers).26 Also because of these aggressive strategies, other auction houses
had to discontinue their operations (Cock and Langford in 1776, Walsh in
1777, Greenwood in 1794) and Christies kept gaining market shares over time.
Almost half of our observations derive from sales organized by Christie’s and
80% from the four main auctions’ houses, namely Christie’s (47%), Edward
Foster (25%), Harry Phillips (8%) and Peter Coxe (2%), while the rest is
spread between a hundred small players, one of which was Sotheby’s, founded
in 1744, but still marginal during our period of observation.27 The dominance
of Christie’s will be strengthened in the Victorian age, reaching a market share
around 90% by the end of the 1800s according to Bayer and Page (2011).
For each auction in the data set, we know the year and the month in which
it took place, the organizer and a variety of characteristics of the sales. We
restrict the analysis to oil paintings for reasons of homogeneity and because
they represent by far the majority of the transactions. For each painting, we
have information on the price of sale in British pounds, the name of the artist
and objective characteristics already used in earlier investigations, such as the
length of the description of the painting (number of letters), the presence of
positive comments on its quality28 and sometimes the identity of its previous
and subsequent owners, almost always British. In some cases, the painting
was bought-in and the price evaluation reﬂects the reserve price of the seller
or the evaluation of the auction organizers.29 Only for a minority of the
observations, the support of the painting was reported in the records, and for
only ten thousands, we also know the height and length of the paintings, in
feet and inches converted into metres. The average surface area is about a
square meter, as typical of a production destined for private homes. Table 1
reports the descriptive statistics for the full data set in columns 1–3 and for a
reduced one with only paintings whose size is known in column 4–6. The lat-
ter represents a more homogeneous group of high-quality paintings (for which
additional information, such as surface area, was recorded).
26 This is a typical phenomenon in two-sided markets (Rochet and Tirole, 2003).
27 In spite of the large number of observations, our sample may not be entirely representa-
tive for the distribution of auction houses over the years; therefore, we cannot safely infer
the evolution of market shares. However, it is well known that Christie’s conquered the
majority of the auction market by the end of our period of investigation.
28 From this, we build a dummy variable ‘Beautiful’ present in the regression as a proxy
for quality. Unfortunately, we do not have systematic information on the exhibition history
of the paintings (on its role in modern auctions see Hellmanzik, 2016). The genre of the
paintings is rarely indicated, and we could not recover it in a reliable way from the titles in
such a big data set. However, our preliminary investigations on subsamples suggest that
genre diﬀerentials were negligible after taking into account the standard controls.
29 In many cases, it is not speciﬁed whether the painting was sold or bought-in; therefore,
in the baseline regressions, we control with dummies for paintings that are sold or bought-in,
but in subsequent regressions, we focus on paintings that were explicitly sold.
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Painters are mostly from the Dutch and Flemish school (36% and 16%),
the Italian school (22%), the British school (17%) and the French school
(7%) but the absolute and relative frequency of British painters increases over
time, which reﬂects the evolution of the composition of British collections. In
particular, the number of observations from the British school doubles in the
last two decades of the 1700s and then is constantly in the range of 18–20%,
while the number of distinct British artists traded in each year increases four
times (from less than thirty to more than a hundred). There are also some
early American painters, such as Benjamin West, John Singleton Copley,
Mather Brown and Gilbert Stuart. The most common attributions are for
works by old masters such as Rubens and Teniers (with more than four thou-
sands observations each), van Dyck, Rembrandt and Titian. The most
Table 1
Descriptive statistics
Variable
Full dataset Reduced dataset
Mean SD
Av. price
(pounds) Mean SD
Av. price
(pounds)
Price (pounds) 16.916 85.895 69.461 178.024
Size (in metres) 1.037 1.523
Unknown support 0.969 0.174 15.75 0.608 0.488 67.14
Canvas 0.008 0.088 83.41 0.139 0.346 86.62
Copper 0.009 0.092 16.7 0.03 0.171 53.99
Panel 0.015 0.121 57.48 0.222 0.416 67.14
Copy 0.044 0.204 6.4 0.029 0.168 27.4
Inscripted 0.005 0.069 49.84 0.009 0.093 233.31
Nr paintings sold together 1.089 0.285 1.048 0.213
Description length 59 96 129 206
Beautiful 0.032 0.176 79.1 0.095 0.293 172.9
Current place known 0.01 0.102 237.4 0.058 0.234 295.73
Previous owner known 0.032 0.177 121.01 0.114 0.318 209.65
Sale outcome unknown 0.144 0.306 23.78 0.346 0.427 46.08
Bought-in 0.269 0.443 19.59 0.164 0.37 130.49
Sold 0.588 0.492 14.03 0.49 0.5 62.02
January 0.057 0.233 6.39 0.004 0.066 16.67
February 0.097 0.297 12.11 0.072 0.259 38.52
March 0.149 0.356 15.55 0.181 0.385 44.74
April 0.133 0.34 20.52 0.169 0.375 83.11
May 0.182 0.386 25.02 0.299 0.458 92.17
June 0.159 0.366 22.44 0.179 0.383 80.47
July 0.078 0.268 11.86 0.062 0.241 34
August 0.018 0.131 5.46 0.012 0.109 17.54
September 0.008 0.091 4.27 0.004 0.063 11.86
October 0.01 0.097 3.2 0.003 0.056 14.97
November 0.056 0.229 8.9 0.01 0.099 6.82
December 0.053 0.224 11.54 0.005 0.071 12.16
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frequent British painters are all from the 1700s, as the painter of animals
George Moreland (with 2716 sales), and the portraitists Reynolds (1733 sales)
and Gainsborough (1194 sales), while the only continental painter from the
1700s whose works could be equally popular in London’s auctions was Cana-
letto (with 1492 attributed sales).
The average price of the domestic works is much lower than the one of
imported paintings, with about £ 10 for an average British painting against £
23 for Italian and French paintings and £ 17 for Dutch paintings. In addition,
the best priced paintings are all from the continental schools with more than
a hundred paintings sold for more than a thousand pounds and almost ﬁve
thousand paintings priced above a hundred pounds. The highest recorded
evaluation is for a landscape by Poussin, bought in at £ 10,080 in 1822, while
the Portrait of the Shipbuilder Jan Rijcksen and his Wife by Rembrandt (1633,
now in the Buckingham Palace) was sold in 1811 for £ 5250. These were
paintings with a reliable attribution, but of course, the majority of continental
paintings were sold for much lower prices, in spite of remarkable, and some-
times disputable, attributions. Many of these were only by followers of the
master or were copies, if not products of a new increasing phenomenon: home
produced forgeries of paintings by old foreign masters (see Zeri, 1990).
The highest prices for British paintings, besides the Death of the late Earl of
Chatham by John Singleton Copley, were for works by Joshua Reynolds, such
as A rest of the holy family priced £ 1995 in 1829. Indeed, we know that Rey-
nolds was able to bargain unprecedented prices for his innovative portraits.
His Mrs. Siddons as the tragic muse had a big impact at the 1784 exhibition,
although it was not sold immediately by Reynolds. As Solkin (2015, p. 203)
tells us, the painting ‘returned to the artist’s studio, where it presumably func-
tioned as a “show picture” until 1790, when Reynolds ﬁnally found a buyer
(the former French Minister of Finance Charles Alexandre de Calonne), who
was prepared to meet his huge (and extensively publicized) asking price of
1000 guineas. Few eighteenth-century British painters were more astute mar-
ket operators’. Our records show that this painting was resold for £ 1,837 in
1823.
Considering the primary role of land and landownership in the British cul-
ture, it is normal to ﬁnd also well paid landscapes in the data set. One of the
ﬁrst successful painters in this genre was Richard Wilson, whose Italianized
landscapes were highly regarded as an artistic investment. We know that the
prints of his Destruction of the children of Niobe (1761) earned £ 2000, an
unprecedented proﬁt for prints of a landscape, and one of the replicas of the
painting of Rome from the Villa Madama (1765), originally executed in his trip
to Italy, was sold for 222 guineas. Auction records show that in 1827 A Grand
Landscape view on the Arno by Wilson was sold by the famous collector John
Leicester, Baron de Tabley, for the considerable amount of £ 493. Neverthe-
less, some later landscapists obtained even greater success.
Joseph William Turner (1775–1851) reached prices comparable with those
of the best portrait painters. Already in 1799 he was selling a watercolour of
Caernarvon Castle for 40 guineas to John Julius Angerstein, whose huge
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collection will later form the nucleus of the National Gallery. A year later, he
was selling the oil painting Fifth plague of Egypt for 150 guineas to the
famous collector William Beckford. Turner quickly gained the reputation as a
tough bargainer. In 1803 he was asking 300 guineas for the Festival upon the
opening of the vintage of Macon. According to Hamilton (2014, p. 6), ‘Turner
was making a calculated move to benchmark his prices in the light of his own
assessment of his worth. Sir John Leicester, a landed baronet whose income
came from the produce of farms and salt mines in Cheshire, and who had a
penchant for buying British art, oﬀered 250 guineas for the Macon. Turner
refused the oﬀer and held the painting back. The following year Leicester
returned to the subject and oﬀered the asking price, but Turner now
demanded 400 guineas ... another aristocrat, Lord Yarborough, who owned
large swathes if both Lincolnshire and the Isle of Wight, moved in and bought
the painting for the original asking price of 300 guineas. Within two years,
Leicester had got over that loss by acquiring Turner’s Shipwreck for 300 gui-
neas ... Turner’s behaviour in respect of two powerful men bidding for his
favour is a sure sign of artists’ growing awareness of their economic power’.
For Dido building Carthage (1815) Turner refused a thousand guineas oﬀered
by the printer Robinson and later on ﬁve thousand oﬀered from a group of
gentlemen willing to donate that masterpiece to the National Gallery: the
painter himself will leave it to the museum together with the Sun rising
through Vapour on condition that the two paintings would hung always
between two pictures by Claude Lorrain, as they still do. Only the late vision-
ary phase of Turner’s oeuvre lost consensus between collectors, with the nota-
ble exception of the art critic John Ruskin, who will also own some of his
works (including the The Slave Ship, 1840).
John Constable (1776–1837) was not equally successful in his early career.
Only in 1819, he sold his ﬁrst important canvas (The white horse) and was
elected an Associate of the Royal Academy. However, he was rediscovered in
the secondary market, especially when the dealers Arrowsmith and Schroth
introduced his works at the Paris Salon of 1824. He sold only 20 paintings in
England during his life but more than that in France within few years. And at
the end of his life, the prices of his paintings were starting to grow substan-
tially. Our auction data display high prices for both Turner and Constable:
Dutch ﬁshing boats with the sun rising by Turner was sold for £ 514 (but the
buyer was the same Turner trying to protect the value of his paintings) and a
A Waggon passing through a river by Constable was sold for £ 378.
Minor genres reached high prices only in the early XVIII century in both
the primary and secondary market. The Scottish David Wilkie (1785–1841) is
a good example for genre paintings, a ﬁeld in which he obtained a quick lead-
ership with The village politicians and The blind ﬁddler presented at the 1806
exhibition and sold for respectively 30 and 50 guineas. These kinds of paint-
ings will feature increasing prices in the secondary market: for instance, our
records show A Rent-Day by Wilkie to be sold for £ 787 in 1832. The career
of Wilkie ﬂourished soon. For the Letter of introduction, he was already able
to charge 250 guineas in 1813, and Distraining for Rent (1815) was purchased
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for 600 guineas by the Directors of the British Institution.30 This institution
purchased also other paintings by painters active in London, including a large
canvas by West, Our saviour healing the sick in the temple, paid in 1815 the
unprecedented sum of 3000 guineas. The purpose was to patronize domestic
artists and establish a National Gallery,31 which will be founded in 1824.
III EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we report the results of our hedonic regressions for the logged
price of paintings and additional empirical investigations. Table 2 shows the
price regression based on the full data set and the one based on the reduced
data set with complete data on the surface area of the paintings (the latter is
useful to conﬁrm the main results in a more homogenous group of high-qual-
ity paintings). Both regressions control for the artists’ ﬁxed eﬀects (reported in
the Appendix from the baseline regression) and the full speciﬁcation controls
also for the auction houses’ ﬁxed eﬀects (reported in the Appendix as well).
The remaining control variables are common to the two regressions.
Some of the control variables have standard implications found in other
investigations of historical art markets (Etro and Pagani, 2012; Etro and Ste-
panova, 2015 2016, 2017): copies and paintings sold in groups are priced less,
while weak results emerge on the support of the painting (mainly because it
was rarely recorded in the catalogues). Other proxies for the quality of the
item, such as the presence of an inscription on the painting, the length of the
description in the catalogue, a positive commentary in the same description
and the record of previous or current owners are positively correlated with
prices. The reduced sample shows that prices were increasing and concave in
the surface area, but the peak of prices occurs for a relatively small area,
around 4 square metres. It is likely that space constraints in the collectors’
homes constrained demand determining a point of saturation.
On the basis of the baseline regression, we use the year dummies to build a
nominal hedonic price index, which is presented in Fig. 1. This is particularly
reliable because it is based on a large number (210,000) of observations (which
makes estimates of each year coeﬃcients extremely precise) and because we
30 Wilkie will gain even more from the copyrights of his paintings. According to Hamilton
(2014, p. 219), ‘Turner’s 100 guineas for copyright of his Venice is put into the shade by
comparison with the £ 1200 that another star of the engraved painting world, David Wilkie,
was paid in 1829 for the copyright of Chelsea Pensioners Reading the Gazette of the Battle of
Waterloo. This was in addition to the £ 1260 that the Duke of Wellington paid for it on
commission. The engraver, John Burnet, was to receive £ 1575 for his work engraving this
large plate, size 281=4  17 inches, plus one-third of the proﬁts from the sale of the prints’.
31 The famous scientist Joseph Banks was a strong supporter of these kinds of economic
incentives for the arts. In a letter of 1805, he wrote: ‘The Venetian School arose when that
Town was the Emporium of the East; the Flemish when Antwerp was that of the Western
World; and the Roman when appeals to the Roman Ecclesiastical Courts made their Law-
yers almost as rich as our Civilians are now ... the time is come when England has the means
through her commercial prosperity to foster a fourth school ... If half the money that has of
Late years been lavished upon Repainted originals had been divided among our artists, the
business would by this time have been done ... The Arts will always ﬂourish in Proportion to
the patronage given them by the Rich’.
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directly control for quality through the artists’ ﬁxed eﬀects (such a control
was not feasible in other hedonic price indexes for historical periods due to
the lack of enough data per painter per year).32 Therefore, this nominal index
represents the market price of a representative painting with given quantiﬁable
characteristics over time, or, equivalently, it represents the value of a diversi-
ﬁed investment in the British art market. We have also run the baseline
regression on the basis of prices adjusted for the cost of living in London,33
obtaining very similar results. The corresponding real price index is also
shown in Fig. 1.
In the Appendix (Table A1), we report the coeﬃcients for the artists’ ﬁxed
eﬀects divided by national schools. The reference is the pool of paintings
whose authors are unknown or with a low number of observations in the data
set. Between the imported paintings, Dutch artists from the 1600s are the
most frequent and best paid together with classical Italian artists from 1500s
and 1600s. Between the artists of the 1700s, we mainly ﬁnd vedutisti such as
Canaletto, with extremely high prices, Gaspar van Wittel, Michele Marieschi,
Table 2
Price regressions (log of nominal prices)
Baseline OLS regression
OLS regression on
paintings with known size
Artists’ ﬁxed eﬀects (YES) (YES)
Auction houses’ ﬁxed eﬀects (YES)
Year dummies (YES) (YES)
Months dummies (YES) (YES)
Size (in metres) 0.189*** (0.017)
Size (in metres squared) 0.0230*** (0.002)
Unknown support Omitted Omitted
Canvas 0.860*** (0.034) 0.009 (0.048)
Copper 0.015 (0.032) 0.020 (0.069)
Panel 0.380*** (0.025) 0.076** (0.032)
Copy 0.720*** (0.015) 0.948*** (0.067)
Inscripted 0.281*** (0.042) 0.238** (0.113)
Nr paintings sold together 0.814*** (0.011) 0.332*** (0.054)
Description length 0.0036*** (0.00003) 0.0017*** (0.00007)
Beautiful 0.767*** (0.017) 0.429*** (0.04)
Current place known 1.382*** (0.029) 0.959*** (0.05)
Previous owner known 0.783*** (0.017) 0.436*** (0.039)
Bought-in 0.0041 (0.01) 0.622*** (0.046)
Sold 0.216*** (0.009) 0.0607* (0.036)
Constant 1.469*** (0.044) 1.236*** (0.227)
Observations 210 471 9 727
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.57
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
32 Unfortunately we do not have enough evidence on repeated sales to use them to build
alternative estimates or price indeces.
33 The cost of living time series are from Clark (2010). Supplementary data can be found
on the website http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/gclark/data.html
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Giovanni Paolo Panini and even minor ones such as Luca Carlevariis and
Giovanni Battista Cimaroli, French artists such as Claude Vernet, Jean Bap-
tiste Greuze, Hubert Robert, Philip Mercier and Jean Antoine Watteau, few
Dutch artists, such as Willem van Mieris, Jan van Gool, Rachel Ruysch and
Jan van Huysum and Flemish ones, such as Pieter Angellis and Joseph von
Aken (who were actually active in London).
Evaluations for British painters are much lower on average. Remarkably,
the British school shows its highest prices for the two most representative
landscape painters of its Golden Age, namely William Turner and John Con-
stable. In addition, other famous specialists of landscapes, such as Richard
Wilson, Philip de Loutherbourg and Francis Danby, rank well in the British
school. Similarly, the most famous portraitists, namely Joshua Reynolds, Tho-
mas Lawrence, Thomas Gainsborough, Allan Ramsay and the Swiss born
Angelica Kauﬀmann, appear to be well recognized on the monetary scale,
while the portraits of George Romney reached lower prices.34 Indeed, in this
period landscapes and portraits were still the two leading genres in terms of
both demand and artistic achievement. Between the most traditional history
painters, we ﬁnd John Singleton Copley and Benjamin West, who were
between the best paid artists of the time and will export the Grand Manner to
the United States.35 The extreme realism of Joseph Wright of Derby, the
Figure 1. Art price index in London (1780–1840). [Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
34 Part of this is due to the fact that Romney was active outside the academic circle and
public display. ‘Unlike Reynolds, Romney had no wish to impose his own artistic notions
upon his clients, or to make them look like anything other than the upper class, wealthy and
tasteful individuals they were more than happy to be. He did his job extremely well, and
charged considerably lower prices than his leading rivals – so although he often complained
of the drudgery, this did not stop him from going through an enormous volume of business
and acquiring considerable wealth in the process’ (Solkin, 2015, p. 204).
35 West also received an annual wage of £ 1000 from the King as well as major compensa-
tions for the royal commission, such as the £ 1260 for the ‘Moses receiving the law on
Mount Sinai’ (1784).
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visionary dreams of Henry Fuseli and the wonderful horses of George Stubbs
were also priced above average.
Instead, prices are much lower for British paintings of the early portrait
painters such as Cornelius Johnson, Robert Walker, William Dobson, Peter
Lely and Godfrey Kneller, the ﬁrst important ﬁgurative painter, James Thorn-
hill,36 and one of the ﬁrst painters of lanscapes, John Wootton. Most of all,
also the beginners of the British Golden Age and of its innovative conversation
pieces, William Hogarth and Francis Hayman, rank well behind average.37
In Fig. 2, we report price indexes for British, Dutch, Italian and French
paintings built in the same way as the general index on each respective sub-
sample.38 Controlling for the artist ﬁxed eﬀects within each school, these
indexes reﬂect the evolution of the price of a representative painting present
in the British collections and traded in the London art market for each
school, independently from changes in the quality of domestic and imported
works over time (in particular, the index is depurated from the increase in
quality of imported paintings at the turn of the century when important conti-
nental collections were sold in London). While the general pattern is very
Figure 2. Price indexes by national school (nominal). [Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
36 Even in the primary market, Thornhill hardly managed to get substantial compensa-
tions. As Pears (1988, pp. 136–137) tells us, in 1717 he ‘was negotiating with the directors of
Greenwich Hospital to establish his rate of pay. Although he made the point that under
Charles I Rubens had been paid £ 10 a yard for the Banqueting House and more recently
Lord Montagu had paid Rousseau £ 7, the directors rejected his request for a mere £ 5’ and
Thornhill had to accept £ 3 a yard.
37 Even lower were the prices of Irish artists, such as George Barret, James O’Connor and
James Barry. Only the ﬁrst obtained some initial success. According to Arnold (1977, p. 69),
there are ‘a number of somewhat apocryphal stories about the large sums of money Barret
earned from his paintings, but it is certain that he was enormously popular. He became
bankrupt, however, and was rescued towards the end of his life by Edmund Burke, who
secured for him the lucrative sinecure of Master Painter to the Chelsea Hospital’.
38 For a more realistic visual inspection, we have scaled the initial price level of each
national school according to school coeﬃcients derived from a pooled regression.
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similar across diﬀerent schools, the gap between the price of a representative
British painting and the price of the representative imported painting remains
substantial along all the period under consideration. This conﬁrms the results
by Bayer and Page (2011). However, in spite of control for artists’ ﬁxed
eﬀects, price diﬀerentials across schools can still reﬂect selection of higher
quality imports and do hide compositional changes, since some painters were
gaining appreciation and others were losing it within each school. To under-
stand whether the demand for new British paintings was actually increasing in
the auction market, we should move to analyse return rates from the invest-
ment in diﬀerent artistic schools and diﬀerent painters.
As well known, the ﬁnancial market of London was already the most
advanced in the world during this period. But also the auction market was
extremely well organized by the end of the 1700s, with a number of competing
auction houses where British collectors could trade art. Our regression on the
reduced sample provides auction houses’ ﬁxed eﬀects that are shown in the
Appendix (Table A2), where we also report the number of observations by
auction house. Christie’s was, by large, the most frequent auction house and
enjoying a positive price diﬀerential (for given painter and other characteris-
tics) compared to the sales from unknown or minor auctions houses. Sothe-
by’s was still a minor player with prices below average at the time. Price gaps
between auction houses could reﬂect diﬀerentiated strategies focusing on
works of various quality (as still in modern auctions), but the auction market
could be regarded as extremely competitive, and therefore it could represent
an interesting investment opportunity.39 Possibly, for the ﬁrst time in art his-
tory, buying art could be seen not only as a hobby but also as a mere ﬁnan-
cial investment whose expected return had to be taken into account and
compared with other investments. Our next task is to verify how attractive
was buying art and in particular British art in this secondary market.
Was investment in British art an attractive ﬁnancial investment?
In a ﬂourishing ﬁnancial centre such as London investment in art could be
seen as a useful source of diversiﬁcation with respect to traditional invest-
ments. The ﬁrst investment option, bonds, was guaranteeing a 3% nominal
interest rate for all the period under consideration through the purchase of a
perpetual gilt (with no maturity) issued by the Bank of England. This bond
provided a constant baseline nominal rate for ﬁnancial investments, anchoring
39 The eﬃciency of the London auction market can be evaluated also comparing prices in
London and other competing art centres of continental Europe. The most important was
Paris and we have a comparable and overlapping data set on art auctions in Paris over the
period 1792–1820, largely described in Etro and Stepanova (2015). Converting prices from
London and Paris auctions into units of a standard consumption basket through the price
series collected by Allen (2001), we can obtain relative prices that are comparable (the com-
position of the basket is the same for both locations: the cost of a consumption basket is
nominated in local currency, that is, in francs – in France and in pounds – in London). We
found 63 cross-border sales extracted from our data sets: in each case, the ﬁrst sale happens
in Paris and the subsequent sale happens in London. Diﬀerentials in price changes are small,
but appear to suggest an increase in London prices by the end of the period.
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the return of alternative investments. The second option, stocks, was available
through investment in the London stock market, which could oﬀer a variety
of risky assets on which we have price records, for instance, from Piketty and
Zucman (2014).40 The Piketty-Zucman equity price index does not include
dividends, on which there are no comprehensive data for the entire stock mar-
ket, therefore it can be interpreted as an index of capital gains. In Fig. 3, we
compare the nominal Piketty-Zucman index with our art price index (also
decomposed in the high and low end of the market).
To evaluate the attractiveness of art investment and, in particular, of invest-
ment in the diﬀerent artistic schools we use a standard Capital Asset Pricing
Model,41 following similar applications on modern data proposed by Stein
(1977), and used by Edwards (2004) on Latin American art, by Hodgson and
Vorkink (2004) on Canadian art and by Agnello (2016) on U.S. art. The aim
is to verify whether art investment could be a useful source of portfolio diver-
siﬁcation for British investors.
We ﬁrst compute the yearly rates of return of investment in art as well as
in the diﬀerent national schools from the price indices derived above. Given
these, the CAPM equation for investment in an art school i implies:
Ri þDið Þ  R ¼ bi Rm þDmð Þ  R½  ð1Þ
where Ri is the ﬁnancial return of investment in paintings of the school i, Di
is the ‘aesthetic dividend’ from holding paintings of school i (Baumol, 1986),
R is the constant riskless rate, Rm is the return from capital appreciation
derived from the index of capital gain and Dm is the dividend rate in the stock
Figure 3. Art prices and equity prices in London (nominal).
40 Equity price index is taken from Table UK.15a of the Supplementary data in Piketty
and Zucman (2014). Full data can be found on the website http://gabriel-zucman.eu/ﬁles/
PikettyZucman2013Book.pdf
41 The origins of this foundational model start with Markowitz (1952) and end with the
derivations by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965).
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market. In the absence of comprehensive data on dividends, we adopt the
heroic assumption that the dividend rate was constant, so that all the variabil-
ity of the stock market return is captured by the capital gains. The beta coeﬃ-
cient bi ¼ CovðRi;RmÞVarðRmÞ is the sensitivity of the expected excess asset returns to
the expected excess market returns. It is well known that the CAPM does not
fully explain the diﬀerences in assets’ returns and that the lack of a complete
market portfolio makes it impossible to properly test for the same validity of
the CAPM (Fama and French, 2004). Nevertheless, it is also understood that
market betas represent an important element of the attractivity of assets in a
portfolio. For this reason, it is interesting to estimate the betas for the returns
on investment in art in general and in the diﬀerent national schools. A
regression:
Ri ¼ ai þ biRm ð2Þ
over the 60 years available provides an estimate of the beta for each school bi
and of the coeﬃcient ai ¼ RDi þ biðDm  RÞ, from which we can recover
the aesthetic dividend of each school:
Di ¼ R ai þ bi Dm  Rð Þ
conditional on the riskless rate R and the dividend rate of the stock market
Dm.
In Table 3, we report average return rate (always net of dividends), the
standard deviation (SD) and estimated alphas and betas for investments in
the stock market and in art. We also decompose the latter in investments in
the four main national schools and the non-attributed paintings, and also in
the low and high ends of the market. The average rate of capital gains in the
stock market is 1.1% and the ﬁnancial return from art investment is 4.3%,
which is broadly in line with the high risk of this investment. Between schools,
the highest return is for the British school (7.2%), followed by the French
school (6.4%), the Italian school (5.2%) and the Dutch school (4.4%), while
investment in paintings without attribution had a lower return than average
(4%). In line with the expected positive correlation of risk and return, the SD
Table 3
Average nominal returns, SD, alpha and beta
Return SD Alpha Beta
Equity index 0.011 0.16
Art price index (average) 0.043 0.258 0.014 0.0483
Art market Low-end (quantile 0.2) 0.054 0.3 0.028 0.187
Art market High-end (quantile 0.8) 0.04 0.266 0.01 0.005
Italian school 0.052 0.309 0.027 0.261
British school 0.072 0.38 0.043 0.077
Dutch school 0.044 0.275 0.013 0.0586
French school 0.064 0.352 0.036 0.132
Not attributed artists 0.04 0.307 0.014 0.028
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of the return rates show that the most risky investment was in the British art
school, followed by the French school, the Italian school, the Dutch school
and the non-attributed paintings.
The estimated beta for art investment is bArt ¼ 4:8% which implies that art
investment was a potential source of diversiﬁcation in the portfolio of British
investors. The estimated betas for the national schools are bIta ¼ 26:1% for
the Italian school, bFra ¼ 13:2% for the French one, bBri ¼ 7:7% for the Bri-
tish and bDutch ¼ 5:9% for the Dutch and Flemish school together. This
shows that returns on investments on Italian and French paintings were
poorly correlated with the stock market, while the return on investment in
British and Dutch art was basically uncorrelated with the stock market
return.
The estimated constants are all positive. In principle, they allow us to
recover the aesthetic dividend of art investment in function of the dividend
rate in the stock market. To ﬁx ideas and only for explanatory purposes,
assuming that the latter was the same as the riskless rate of 3% would gener-
ate an aesthetic dividend Di ¼ 0:03 ai. Given the estimate aArt ¼ 1:4%, the
aesthetic dividend would be 1.6% for an average art investment, higher for
the Dutch school, followed by the Italian school, the French school and, last,
the British school. The aesthetic dividend from non-attributed paintings,
instead, would be the same as for art investment in general (1.6%). If instead
we assume a higher dividend rate in the stock market, which would be consis-
tent with a higher ﬁnancial return on equity (capital appreciation plus divi-
dend) compared to art,42 the implied aesthetic dividend for the Italian school
would be above all the others, leaving always the aesthetic dividend for the
British school as the worst. These results appear broadly in line with the aes-
thetic perception at the time, as well as with the higher quality of foreign
paintings traded in the London market, especially Italians and Dutch com-
pared to the British paintings.
Our simple application of the CAPM model suggests that investment in art,
and in particular in British art, was an attractive investment even if British
collectors did prefer foreign paintings.43 A simple stylized exercise of optimal
portfolio allocation can give some more insights. In Fig. 4, we have plotted
the ﬁnancial return and the SD of diﬀerent assets. To focus on ﬁnancial
aspects only, we have neglected aesthetic dividends but we have assumed, as
above, that the dividend rate in the stock market was 3%. As standard in
ﬁnance theory, the eﬃcient frontier collects the set of portfolios that combine
these assets in proportions that minimize the total variance of the portfolio
for a given portfolio return. We have computed this eﬃcient frontier and
42 As mentioned above, the rate of capital appreciation was 1.1% and the ﬁnancial return
from art investment was 4.3%, which implies that a dividend rate above 3.2% would deliver
a higher return on stocks than on art (this would be consistent with modern ﬁndings in Bau-
mol, 1986). Moreover, the implied aesthetic dividend would be positive for all schools.
43 The best ex post returns in the data set were for paintings by Constable, Wilkie, Rom-
ney and Turner. We did not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant correlation between average prices and aver-
age returns, as the absence of arbitrage opportunities would require.
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shown it in Fig. 4 in bold. Given the riskless rate of 3%, each investor should
choose its favourite portfolio on the capital allocation line, namely a linear
combination of the riskless asset and the ‘tangency portfolio’, also shown in
Fig. 4. The tangency portfolio can be easily determined: such a simple exercise
delivers that about half of the risky investment should be destined to the stock
market (48%) with the residual art investment mostly allocated to the British
school (28%) for its high return and to the French school. Of course, personal
preferences (for risk and for art) would determine the share of the tangency
portfolio on total investment and would alter the share of investment in each
artistic school. However, this ‘back of the envelop’ computation conﬁrms that
there were good ﬁnancial reasons to purchase British paintings on the London
auction market. Since we have seen that most of the trade was focused on
Dutch and Italian paintings, with only 17% for British paintings, this was
putting an upward pressure on the prices of the domestic school.44 Most
important for our purposes, British paintings could be purchased also in the
primary market (indeed mainly domestic paintings were available in the pri-
mary market), therefore the upward pressure was applying also on the prices
of the living British painters.
Further ﬁnancial investigations would be entirely speculative in the absence
of more accurate historical data on the stock market returns. Nevertheless, all
this suggests that increasing investment in art and especially in domestic paint-
ings could have been responsible (together with other factors, such as the
Figure 4. Risk and Return for alternative assets. [Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
44 The results from the optimal portfolio analysis (using Rprogram) are available from
the authors. Remarkably, the optimal share of investment in British art is even increasing
over time moving from 21% of the tengency portfolio in 1780–1800 to 33% in 1801–1820
and 43% in 1821–1840.
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growth of print trade or the impact of the public exhibitions) for an increase
in the proﬁtability of the artistic profession in England.
Were the new British artists innovators?
Our econometric analysis has shown that British paintings were initially
undervalued compared to the continental ones but they were also appreciating
more. However, this neither implies that their value was reaching continental
standards (indeed Bayer and Page, 2011, conﬁrm underevaluation on average
until the end of the XIX century) or implies that new British artists were driv-
ing a process of convergence (indeed a revaluation of the old British masters
may have driven the high returns).
To investigate whether the raising demand for British paintings was respon-
sible for attracting new talents to the profession and promoting new artistic
innovations in the domestic market, we can verify if the quality of new British
art, as priced by the market, did increase over time. In Fig. 5 we relate the
price of a representative painting by artists of diﬀerent national schools and
their year of birth. The price of British painters increases rapidly with the year
of birth, in line with our earlier insights from the artists’ ﬁxed eﬀects. A nega-
tive trend emerges immediately for the Italian school, while no clear trend
appears to emerge for the French and Dutch schools. This is compatible with
the fact that the increasing demand for art of this period attracted not only
new domestic painters, but also better ones, at least in terms of market evalu-
ation. But of course, other explanations could be related to changes in other
features of the paintings, such as the certain attribution, the size and more.
To verify whether new British paintings were indeed increasing in value
compared to others after controlling for the characteristics of the paintings, in
Table 4, we restrict our sample to sales of paintings with a certain attribution
(excluding copies and paintings that are bought-in) and with known surface
area, controlled more precisely with a set of size dummies, and we determine
the price diﬀerentials between paintings of the main national schools. We also
use real prices (adjusted for CPI) as dependent variable. The role of the usual
control variables remains largely unchanged compared to the baseline regres-
sions. Moreover, column (1) conﬁrms that British paintings were on average
21% cheaper than French paintings, and even cheaper compared to Dutch
and Italian ones. Column (2), however, interacts the British dummy with the
year of birth of the painter net of 1600, the beginning of the century in which
the British school starts supplying important artists. The coeﬃcients show that
a representative painting by a British artist born in 1600 was about 60%
cheaper than an imported painting, but this gap was reduced over the years
reaching parity in the year 1600þ 0:8860:00503  1776, corresponding to artists
active since the turn of the century (as Turner and Constable). Column (3)
repeats the same analysis in a reduced data set where we have full information
on the surface area of the paintings. In spite of the diﬀerent sample, the result
is exactly conﬁrmed with a break-even year in 1600þ 1:2620:00719  1776. This is
consistent with the fact that the increasing demand for art of this period and
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the increasing investment in British art did attract both new and better domes-
tic painters, leading to what we now regard as the British Golden Age.
IV CONCLUSIONS
We have analysed the evolution of the price of paintings sold at auctions in
London between 1780 and 1840. A ﬁnancial analysis of this market shows
that investment in art was an attractive opportunity of diversiﬁcation in this
period, and investment in British art in particular was a valuable option. As a
consequence, art trade and domestic art production ﬂourished. We have
argued that the price of a representative painting increased rapidly with the
emerging British artists and reached foreign prices in the last decade of the
Table 4
Price regressions (Log of real prices)
Regression
(1)
Regression
(2)
Regression
(3)
French school Omitted Omitted Omitted
Dutch school 0.00182 (0.1) 0.00123 (0.07) 0.116 (1.57)
Italian school 0.0145 (0.79) 0.0123 (0.67) 0.152* (2.07)
British school 0.231*** (12.09) 0.886*** (26.54) 1.262*** (6.52)
Interaction with
birth  1600
0.00503*** (23.89) 0.00719*** (5.32)
Year dummies (YES) (YES) (YES)
Month dummies (YES) (YES) (YES)
Auction houses’
ﬁxed eﬀects
(YES) (YES) (YES)
Size unknown Omitted Omitted 
Size [0–0.1] m2 0.661*** (9.24) 0.652*** (9.14) Omitted
Size [0.1–0.3] m2 0.767*** (16.39) 0.768*** (16.45) 0.217** (3.04)
Size [0.3–0.5] m2 0.819*** (12.75) 0.826*** (12.91) 0.333*** (4.05)
Size [>0.5] m2 0.873*** (25.51) 0.879*** (25.78) 0.426*** (6.21)
Unknown support Omitted Omitted Omitted
Canvas 0.105 (1.6) 0.0885 (1.35) 0.01 (0.11)
Copper 0.216*** (3.61) 0.208*** (3.48) 0.0472 (0.39)
Panel 0.00877 (0.19) 0.0152 (0.33) 0.141* (2.48)
Nr paintings sold
together
1.046*** (64.49) 1.028*** (63.49) 0.645*** (6.00)
Inscripted 0.221** (3.19) 0.247*** (3.58) 0.0664 (0.36)
Description length 0.00367*** (61) 0.00365*** (60.99) 0.00309*** (22.91)
Beautiful 0.825*** (29.98) 0.816*** (29.76) 0.503*** (7.72)
Current place
known
1.202*** (27.86) 1.202*** (27.97) 0.888*** (11.13)
Previous owner
known
0.622*** (22.38) 0.638*** (23.01) 0.434*** (6.74)
Constant 2.667*** (28.63) 2.665*** (28.72) 3.982*** (6.06)
Observations 77 421 77 421 3 490
R2 0.35 0.36 0.52
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
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1700s. This suggests that the increasing demand for British art of this period
attracted new and better domestic painters.
The subsequent period, the Victorian age between 1840 and 1900, has been
analysed in detail by Bayer and Page (2011). This period continued the trends
emphasized in our work, and the fast economic development of England was
associated with a further increase in the price of paintings and artistic product
diﬀerentiation and innovation (especially with the Pre-Raphaelits under the
inﬂuence of Ruskin). The secondary art market was always more dominated
by Christie’s as the leading auction platform and by art dealers as buyers and
intermediaries.45 In addition, the volume of trade of contemporary and
domestic paintings increased compared to that of old master paintings. How-
ever, at the end of the century, economic growth started to slow down and
art prices started to decline as well. New markets and new leading artistic
movements were emerging in Paris and elsewhere.
Nevertheless London will retain the international status of the leading auc-
tion centre during the following century, and most of the secondary trade in
the high segment of the art market will take place in Christie’s or Sotheby’s
auctions around the world.
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